We analyze how economic shocks and policies a¤ect the intensity of social con‡ict. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce con ‡ict. In our model, positive shocks to labor intensive industries diminish social con ‡ict, while positive shocks to capital intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that appropriation activities be more labor intensive than the economy. Our theory explains empirical patterns of con ‡ict, for example, the positive association between crime and inequality, and the curse of natural resources. Including appropriation activities into a canonic general equilibrium model helps explain why reforms that appear e¢ ciencyenhancing a priori may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented, and why societies may sympathise with some populist policies and seemingly ine¢ cient redistribution.
Introduction
One enduring aspect of social life is the con ‡ict over the distribution of resources. The division of wealth among individuals is not solely determined by a price system operating on the basis of well de…ned, and perfectly enforced, property rights. 1 In reality, con ‡ict over resources plays an important role, and takes various forms ranging from criminal activities to guerrilla groups (which even when motivated by ideology or ethnicity also depend on their ability to recruit members and appropriate resources). Economists have historically analyzed phenomena like crime and revolts or civil wars separately. 2 But these phenomena all express individual and group pressures for the appropriation of resources, and as such may be analyzed in a single economic framework. Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that, all else equal, a lower opportunity cost in terms of wages should increase individual propensities toward rebellion or crime.
3 Yet real life shocks a¤ecting the opportunity costs of con ‡ict (e.g., wages) also tend to a¤ect the returns to con ‡ict and viceversa. To study these general equilibrium e¤ects we incorporate social con ‡ict, seen as an appropriation-based phenomenon, into two classic models for a small open economy (the Heckscher-Ohlin and the Ricardo-Viner setups). This general equilibrium approach o¤ers an integrated view of how the costs and bene…ts to con ‡ict activities move in response to economic shocks and policies and accounts for stylized facts of civil wars and crime. The economy we consider comprises two productive sectors and a third, unproductive sector we call "appropriation."This last sector appropriates a fraction of what is created in the two productive sectors. The size of the appropriation sector provides a measure of social con ‡ict. Assuming that appropriation is labor intensive relative to the whole economy, we show that an exogenous increase in the price of the capital intensive good will cause the appropriation sector to expand. The reason is that an increase in the price of the capital intensive good will lower wages (by Stolper-Samuelson) and result in lower costs for the appropriation activity relative to the amount of appropriable resources. The consequence is 1 Even in highly developed countries property rights are not perfectly enforced. In the US for example, the total value of appropriated wealth in a year is beyond 5% of GDP and the total burden of crime is beyond 15% of GDP (Anderson 1999) . In less developed countries social con ‡ict can also be very costly. During the typical civil war, "the total income loss cumulates to around 60 percent of a year's GDP." (Collier et al. 2003, p21) . 2 Classic references in the literature on crime are Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) . General equilibrium models of crime include Ehrlich (1981) , Burdett et al. (2003) and Imrohoro¼ glu et al. (2000 and . Various references to work on revolts are given below.
3 MacCulloch (2001) …nds that higher household income diminishes the propensity to express support for a revolt. Empirical studies on the relationship between wages and crime suggest that higher wages deter participation in criminal activities (see Grogger 1998, and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard 2002). more appropriation. Technological progress, which makes society richer, has similar e¤ects: neutral technical progress in the capital intensive sector will increase con ‡ict but progress in the labor intensive sector will decrease it. The e¤ect of a shock depends not only on whether it raises income, but also on how it a¤ects the relative scarcity of labor. This in turn depends on the relative use of factors in the sector initially a¤ected by the shock. Using the Ricardo-Viner model where capital is industry-speci…c we can analyze situations where a natural resource is seen as an industry-speci…c capital for, say, an extractive industry. We show that increases in the endowment of such natural resource increase con ‡ict.
Our theory explains empirical patterns of civil wars such as, for example, the paradoxical fact that con ‡ict can be triggered both by income-diminishing circumstances, such as droughts, and income-augmenting ones, such as a higher availability of natural resources. 4 The model can also explain the connection between inequality and crime: shocks that increase the capital-labor income gap will increase appropriation.
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Our theory has policy implications. For example, trade policies in industrialized countries that prevent labor intensive exports from poor nations will not only reduce their chance to grow but may increase con ‡ict as well. Our theory also suggests that growth based on natural resources is unlikely to reduce con ‡ict. This is importance at a time when the natural resources demand pull of China and India o¤ers an opportunity to poorer countries to grow.
In contrast, policies that can reduce con ‡ict include subsidies to productive labor …-nanced with taxes on capital, departures from free trade such as the protection of labor intensive activities, and subsidies to technical progress or infrastructure in labor intensive industries. We show that the reductions in con ‡ict achievable through such interventions can be so important so as to make both workers and capitalists better o¤. In addition, in our framework policy instruments must be distortionary in order to reduce con ‡ict. Lump sum redistribution yields no gains. This o¤ers a new explanation for why redistribution takes distortionary forms -they buy social peace.
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Our results should not be seen as an endorsement of anti-trade policies: the theory calls for the reduction of barriers to labor intensive exports from (and capital intensive imports to) con ‡ict societies, and not for the erection of such barriers. Similarly, while our theory may rationalize some populist policies, it should not be seen as yielding support to every form of state intervention.
Our approach abstracts from several factors that may a¤ect con ‡ict. Examples are income e¤ects, unemployment, capital accumulation 7 , and additional connections between natural resources and con ‡ict. 8 Another example is the possibility of cooperation in repeated game settings where coercion is possible-see Gar…nkel (1990) , Powell (1993) , and . 9 Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) study the incentives of countries to arm themselves and dispute a resource in the face of posterior opportunities for exchange. In a recent paper, Gar…nkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2004) analyze the e¤ects of trade opening when factions can arm themselves to dispute a resource stock. The key element in the last two papers is the price of a contested stock relative to that of a produced good. In our theory goods' relative prices matter directly (through their impact on the value of disputable wealth), but also indirectly through their impact on the relative value of di¤erent production factors. Our model can be applied to the phenomenon of rent-seeking. In particular, our appropriation sector could be thought to capture rent-seeking e¤orts under exogenous tari¤s (see also Krueger 1974, and Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980) . 10 Besides di¤erences in focus and modeling choices, our theory di¤ers signi…cantly from other rent-seeking accounts. Our model produces comparative statics that are driven by the relative use of factors across industries. The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium after proving its existence. Then a comparison is made with the equilibrium in a con ‡ict-free society. Section 4 studies how economic shocks a¤ect the extent of social con ‡ict. Section 5 discusses policy-making under the social constraint imposed by appropriation activities. Section 6 extends the basic model to the case of industry-speci…c factors. Section 7 concludes. 7 For con ‡ict in growth models see Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and González (2005) . See Tornell and Velasco (1992) for a model of growth in an economy with weak institutions and international capital mobility.
8 Extractive activities, for example, tend to be associated with monopolic rents. These in turn are associated with higher corruption, and the latter can be expected to damage the quality of institutions and economic performance. The end result may well be higher con ‡ict. For the connection between rents and corruption see Ades and Di Tella (1999) , and for the role of institutions see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) . Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Levchenko (2004) study the relationship between institutions and trade. See also Tornell and Velasco (1992) , Tornell and Lane (1996) , and Torvik (2002) on resource abundance and rent seeking. Ross (2003) lists various connections between natural resources and con ‡ict. 9 See Grossman (1991) , Skaperdas (1992) , Hirshleifer (1995) , Grossman and Kim (1995) and Esteban and Ray (1999) for other models where parties can attack each other. 10 On the more removed case of endogenous tari¤s, see Findlay and Wellisz (1982) , and Magee, Brock and Young (1989) .
The model
Consider an economy comprising two productive sectors along the lines of the canonical 2x2 international economics model. 11 The productive sectors involve many …rms which maximize pro…ts and use technologies characterized by constant returns to scale. The two productive sectors or industries are labeled 1 and 2, and they use two inputs which we call capital and labor, respectively labeled K and L. Factors can move freely across industries. All …rms in each industry share the same production function with the property that industry 1 is more capital intensive than industry 2. We denote with r and w the respective rental prices of capital and labor. The given primitives of the model are: the factor endowments, available in …xed amounts K and L; the technologies; and the prices of output, which are internationally determined and are labeled p 1 for industry 1, and p 2 = 1 for industry 2. (Good 2 is the numeraire.) In addition to the productive sectors, there exists an appropriation sector. This sector only uses labor (L A ) and produces a redistribution of output from the productive industries towards the appropriation sector. 12 The technology of appropriation is summarized by the continuous and concave function A (L A ), with A (0) 0 and A L 1. The function A (L A ) speci…es the fraction of the total production value that is appropriated when L A units of labor are devoted to appropriation activities. The concavity assumption re ‡ects congestion e¤ects in appropriation. Given production levels q 1 and q 2 in the two industries, and L A units of labor devoted to appropriation, the amount appropriated is A (L A ) [p 1 q 1 + q 2 ]. Given that under constant returns to scale payments to factors exhaust the value of production, the appropriated amount can be written as A (L A ) rK + w(L L A ) . For simplicity of exposition we assume that appropriators target factor owners and steal a fraction of their returns. But, as we discuss later, the equilibrium conditions and the results do not change if we assume instead that a fraction of their endowments is stolen or that appropriators target the output or revenues of …rms. In any case, r and w represent the gross (before appropriation) rental prices of capital and labor in the productive sectors.
Workers decide whether to enter the productive sectors or the appropriation sector. A worker in the latter earns
. We assume that each worker is in…n-itesimally small and that there is free entry into the appropriation sector. Therefore, the amount of labor in this sector is determined by the equality of the return to appropriation 11 See Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Jones (1965) . 12 The extreme assumption that the appropriation sector uses no capital is made for simplicity only. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for our results to emerge is that the appropriation sector be more labor intensive than the overall economy. This allows for appropriation being less labor intensive than the labor intensive industry. See the appendix for a demonstration. and the opportunity cost to appropriation (the net wage in a productive industry). 13 We have assumed that, just like the productive sectors, appropriation is a perfectly competitive activity. In real life, whether the …ght for resources takes the form of atomistic criminals or large, politically organized factions will depend on many factors shaping what we could call the industrial organization of social con ‡ict. Our formulation in the main text focuses on the competitive case for simplicity only. In the appendix we o¤er a general version of the model encompassing as particular cases all regimes from perfect competition to monopoly and show that the same results hold. Similarly, for simplicity we do not consider in the main model the possibility that the public enforcement of the law may respond to changes in the environment. We show in the appendix that the existence of endogenous enforcement does not a¤ect the results. Finally, our model also abstracts from losses that appropriation activities may cause by way of destruction of life and property. Incorporating those is straightforward and would not a¤ect the results either.
The equilibrium
In this section we characterize conditions for existence of an equilibrium with appropriation in our economy. We then describe this equilibrium and compare it to that in an economy where social con ‡ict is absent.
For most of the analysis it is useful to de…ne the minimum unit-cost requirements of inputs in each industry: a ij is the amount of input j used to produce one unit of output i at minimum cost (given r and w).
As is standard, we focus on equilibria without productive specialization (i.e. both q 1 and q 2 are positive). Given the technology, output prices (p 1 ) and factor endowments (K and L), the equilibrium of the model determines the rental price of factors (r and w), the output production levels (q 1 and q 2 ), and the utilization of factors in each sector (
Three sets of conditions must be satis…ed in a competitive equilibrium. First, …rms in the productive industries must earn zero pro…ts:
Second, the market for factors must clear:
13 For a derivation of this equilibrium condition for the similar problem of exploitation of a common resource see Dasgupta and Heal (1979) .
Third, a no arbitrage condition must hold, in the sense that labor must obtain similar returns when engaging in appropriation as when it is employed by the productive industries:
This last condition merely says that the individual payo¤ from appropriation in the left hand side of equation (5), the value of appropriated goods per unit of labor deployed to expropriation, must equal the returns from work net of appropriation losses in the right hand side. This expression is straightforward in the case that appropriation targets factor owners, but also applies to any of the other interpretations given before. Proof. Note that L A does not appear in equations (1) and (2). Thus, the existence of an appropriation sector does not a¤ect the gross rental price of factors unless it results in specialization. The condition for no specialization in an economy without appropriation is
, while that in the economy with appropriation is
. In other words, the amount of L A that solves equation (5) should be small enough (say L A is below some level we label b L). Simplifying equation (5) 
there is an equilibrium with positive
is increasing, and the economy does not specialize.
14 In the case when it is the output of …rms that is targeted, the value of production available for repaying factors will be a¤ected by the same coe¢ cient in both sectors. The reader might wonder whether the existence of appropriation should a¤ect the …rst two equations in the system, which appear exactly as in the canonic model without appropriation. Firms would obtain net prices a¤ected by a factor 1 A(:) in the right hand side, and we would get net equilibrium factor pricesŵ;r. Now note that the unitary input requirement coe¢ cients are homogeneous of degree zero in factor prices. Then, because the system (1)- (2) has a unique solution, we must haveŵ = (1 A)w andr = (1 A)r. All factors 1 A disappear, and we are left with the same …rst pair of equations.
In the remainder of the paper we restrict attention to economies with an active appropriation sector.
Comparison of economies with and without con ‡ict
The economies with and without an appropriation sector can be easily compared. In the case of no specialization that we focus on, the existence of an appropriation sector does not a¤ect the absolute gross rental prices of factors. These are solely determined by the characteristics of productive technologies, and the amount of labor engaging in appropriation is residually determined in equations (3) to (5) so that the market for factors will clear and no one will gain by reallocating labor units across activities.
The presence of appropriation activities, however, does a¤ect the rental prices net of appropriation that factor owners actually receive. In fact, the existence of an appropriation sector hurts all agents, including those who go into the appropriation sector.
Proposition 2 The existence of the appropriation sector makes the owners of capital and labor worse o¤.
Proof. If there is no specialization, the rental price of factors are the values of r and w that solve equations (1) and (2). Then, total incomes to capital and labor without an appropriation sector are rK and wL, respectively. With appropriation without specialization, the gross rental prices of factors do not change but the net rental prices are respectively (1 A (L A )) r and (1 A (L A )) w. Therefore, total incomes to capital and labor with an appropriation sector are (1 A (L A )) rK and (1 A (L A )) wL, respectively.
The possibility that workers may become criminals or warriors poses a paradox, in that they will end up worse o¤ than if they could commit not to leave productive activities. The reason is that workers in the appropriation sector impose a negative externality on the rest of the economy.
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In addition, appropriation a¤ects the relative importance of the productive sectors in the economy.
Proposition 3 The existence of the appropriation sector increases the production of the capital intensive good and reduces the production of the labor intensive good.
Proof. If there is no specialization, the rental price of factors are the values of r and w that solve equations (1) and (2). These determine the values of a 1K , a 2K , a 1L and a 2L in equations (3) and (4). Given the amount of factors available for production (K and L L A ) these equations determine the levels of production in the two productive industries. It can be easily shown that:
so increments in L A must increase q 1 and reduce q 2 when
This proposition is an application of Rybczynski's (1955) theorem, and it tells us that the presence of con ‡ict enlarges the capital intensive sector. This has implications for the empirical study of the connection between con ‡ict and natural resources. In countries where extractive industries are relatively capital intensive, they could account for a larger share of economic activity as a consequence-and not a cause-of con ‡ict. As will be shown below, our theory also predicts a causality e¤ect going in the opposite direction: shocks that favor and enlarge extractive, capital intensive activities will increase con ‡ict. This two-way causation poses a challenge to empirical work trying to estimate the impact of natural resource availability on con ‡ict.
Shocks and the intensity of social con ‡ict
We study now how changes in the parameters of the model a¤ect the level of con ‡ict. We …rst study changes in output prices.
Changes in the terms of trade
Changes in the price of commodities a¤ect the rental price of factors. In an economy with an appropriation sector, this e¤ect is the same as in an economy without an appropriation sector.
Lemma 1 (Stolper and Samuelson) An increase of the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase in the rental price of capital and a decrease in the rental price of labor dr dp 1 > 0 and dw dp 1 < 0 .
Proof. Di¤erentiating equations 1 and 2 and using the envelope theorem it is straightforward to show that:
This fundamental result of international economics is key to two of the central results of this paper, captured in propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 4 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase in con ‡ict dL A dp 1 0 .
Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as
The conditions for the implicit function theorem are satis…ed, so we can write L A as a function of p 1 . Di¤erentiating the previous equality with respect to p 1 we obtain:
The denominator is negative from the concavity of A (L A ) and the equilibrium condition in the appropriation sector. Then, dL A dp 1 has the sign of d( r w ) dp 1 , which is positive by Lemma 1 (Stolper-Samuelson).
The intuition for this result is as follows. In our model the level of con ‡ict responds to a balance between the opportunity cost of appropriation activities and the value of potentially appropriable resources (as captured in the right and left hand sides of equation (5), respectively). An increase in the price of the capital intensive good expands the capital intensive sector while the labor intensive sector contracts. The latter sector releases more labor per unit of capital than the former sector can absorb at the initial factor prices. This availability of labor lowers wages and with them the opportunity cost of the appropriation activity compared with the size of disputable wealth. The result is more con ‡ict. The way this result arises from the model can be easily explained by means of Figure 1 . A little manipulation of equation (5) shows that the amount of labor in the appropriation sector is determined by the intersection of the concave function A (L A ) with the linear function 
Changes in Technology
Technical progress unambiguously increases society's ability to create wealth. However, there are instances in which technical change will increase con ‡ict. In what follows we call technical progress in an industry neutral if it does not a¤ect the industry's ratio of marginal productivities given its capital to labor ratio -see Hicks (1932) .
Proposition 5 Neutral technical progress in the capital intensive sector results in an increase in con ‡ict. Proof. Consider a neutral technical innovation that makes the capital intensive sector 1 + times more productive ( > 0). This implies that the zero pro…t condition in that sector can now be written as: ra 1K + wa 1L = (1 + ) p 1 . Therefore, technological progress in the capital intensive sector has the same e¤ect on r and w as an increase of the price of the capital intensive good. The result then follows from Proposition 4.
Analogously, neutral technical progress in the labor intensive sector results in a decrease in social con ‡ict. Note that the result that technical change will increase con ‡ict does not rely on such change being of a labor-saving kind, which would of course yield the result more easily. Innovations can lead to more con ‡ict even when being factor-neutral.
Policy analysis with a social constraint
In this section we study how the existence of con ‡ict introduces a "social constraint"to policy analysis: policies that are optimal in theory may be costly because of their impact on social con ‡ict and become undesirable. We …rst examine how subsidies to workers in the productive sectors, …nanced with taxes to capitalists, can reduce the level of social con ‡ict and enlarge the total value of production in the economy. We analyze next the policy implications of our proposition that technical progress in the capital intensive industry will increase con ‡ict. We show that this increase in con ‡ict can be as large as to make everybody worse o¤, so policies a¤ecting the adoption of technical innovations might be justi…ed. Finally, we examine a rationale for trade policy intervention, both from a domestic and an international perspective. The results of this section help explain how certain policy reforms that appear Pareto-improving in a frictionless model may be rendered ine¢ cient by the social backlash to policy in a con ‡ictive world. Once the social constraint is incorporated to policy analysis, policies that seem distortionary may instead be Pareto-improving. This is of course an instance of the theorem of the second best: in the presence of a distortion, another distortion may improve matters (see Lipsey and Lancaster 1956 ). In our model, the original distortion is given by the presence of appropriation activities. The policies rationalized in this section …t the populist stereotype. The results in this section suggest that such policies could emerge, to a certain degree, as a rational response to con ‡ict, rather than as the result of clientelism, corruption, or a sheer taste for redistribution.
Taxes and social con ‡ict
Consider a tax-subsidy scheme such that workers in the productive sectors receive a subsidy equal to a fraction s of the wage …rms pay to them. To fund these subsidies, capitalists pay a tax equal to a proportion t of the rent to capital. Given taxes t and subsidies s, the equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector becomes:
In addition we ask that the government keep a balanced budget:
The model is completed with equations (1) to (4).
Proposition 6 Giving a subsidy to productive labor reduces the level of con ‡ict
Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A (L A ) =
. Di¤erentiating this condition with respect to s, and evaluating the expression at s = 0, we obtain:
. The denominator is negative from the concavity of A (L A ) and the equilibrium condition in the appropriation sector without subsidies. Then,
The intuition for this result is direct. Subsidizing productive labor increases the opportunity costs of engaging in appropriation, thus reducing the latter. A subsidy to productive labor results in a shift of labor away from appropriation activities and towards the productive sectors of the economy. Therefore, the tax-subsidy scheme has a positive e¤ect on the total amount of output in an economy with an appropriation sector, providing an e¢ ciency rationale for a set of policies that are usually considered solely redistributive.
If lump sum taxes and transfers were possible, then our tax-subsidy scheme would be Pareto optimal, because the total value of production could be increased while making sure capitalists are being left at least as happy as before paying any taxes. When dealing with the issue of social con ‡ict, however, it may not be appropriate to assume that all transfers among agents are possible. For example, it might be impossible to tax the agents in the appropriation sector.
If we restrict ourselves to the case in which the government can only tax and subsidize agents in the productive sectors, the issue of the Pareto optimality of subsidies to productive labor becomes more complicated. We must study the e¤ects of this policy in the net wages and rental price of capital. It is straightforward to see that a subsidy to productive labor always makes workers in the productive industries better o¤. The subsidy has two e¤ects, 1) it has a direct positive e¤ect in the gross total wage, and, 2) it reduces the appropriation sector and hence the expropriation su¤ered by workers. Both e¤ects go in the same direction, increasing the net income of workers. Those in the appropriation sector must also be better o¤ given that in equilibrium they are indi¤erent regarding their career decisions. In the case of owners of capital, the two e¤ects go in opposite directions: under the tax-subsidy scheme, 1) they pay a tax, but 2) the "appropriation tax"diminishes. If the second e¤ect overcomes the …rst, we have that the proposed scheme makes both workers and capitalists better o¤. We now show by example that there are economies where the tax-subsidy scheme proposed above is Pareto-improving.
Example 1 Taxes, subsidies, and social con ‡ict in a Cobb-Douglas economy:
Consider an economy with production functions q 1 = K 2 for the labor intensive sector. Let us set the total endowments of the two factors of production at levels K = L = 100. In this example we characterize the equilibrium both for the case without an appropriation sector (L A = 0) and the case in which there is an appropriation sector with the following technology:
. In the latter case we consider both the situation with no intervention (s = t = 0) and a situation with state intervention through a tax-subsidy scheme. In this case, we consider a subsidy to productive labor of 10% (s = 0:1), which is funded through a tax on capital. The public budget is balanced in equilibrium. Figure 2 shows the output combinations that can be obtained in equilibrium for the three cases. The graph coincides with the production possibility frontier for the economy without an appropriation sector (given the Pareto optimality of equilibria). That is not the case under social con ‡ict, where the set of production pairs that can be obtained is to the south-west of the pairs for the economy without social con ‡ict. The existence of social con ‡ict introduces a wedge between what it is technically feasible and what can be obtained in equilibrium. Interestingly, a subsidy to productive labor moves the set of production pairs under con ‡ict toward the ones without con ‡ict. In fact, the subsidy allows for the total elimination of income of capital (net of government taxes and appropriation losses, labeled with "NIK") as a function of p 1 for the three di¤erent scenarios (L A =0, s=0, s=0.1). The …gure shows that social con ‡ict results in a lower income for capitalists. For relatively high levels of p 1 , and given the existence of the appropriation sector, capitalists are better o¤ with a subsidy to productive labor (and a tax to capital) than without it.
The welfare e¤ects discussed in this example will not disappear in a dynamic economy with endogenous investment. If taxes on capital and subsidies to productive labor can reduce con ‡ict so much as to reduce the total burden on capitalists, they will increase capital accumulation rather than decrease it. Finally, note that even when lump sum redistribution is feasible, in our model the optimal intervention will be distorsive. Policy induced distortions are necessary to increase the incentive to work and decrease the incentive to loot. There is a literature in economics seeking to explain why income redistribution adopts ine¢ cient forms. Explanations have been linked to asymmetric information or commitment problems (Coate and Morris 1995, Dixit and Londregan 1995) . In our model, the apparently ine¢ cient instruments may be in fact e¢ cient, while distortion-free instruments will not achieve the goal of reducing con ‡ict.
Trade policy intervention and social con ‡ict

Domestic trade policy in the small economy
Here we explain how trade policy intervention in the small open economy can reduce social con ‡ict, and how this intervention can be Pareto-improving. Imagine a country that is a net importer of goods produced in its labor intensive industry, and is a net exporter of goods produced in its capital intensive industry. Our Proposition 4 indicates that social con ‡ict can be diminished through a raise in the price of the labor intensive good and a decrease in the price of the capital intensive good. Therefore, if the government desires to attain a reduction in con ‡ict, it might consider imposing a tari¤ on imports. This protection will increase the price that domestic producers in the labor intensive sector can obtain for their goods, causing an expansion of the sector, an increase in wages, and a drop in social con ‡ict. This drop could be large enough for both capitalist and workers to bene…t from the protection of the labor intensive industry. A reduction in social con ‡ict can also be attained by taxing the exports of the capital intensive sector. In the converse case that the country is a net exporter of labor intensive goods, and a net importer of capital intensive goods, a government that wishes to diminish con ‡ict would impose subsidies on both the labor intensive exports and the capital intensive imports.
International trade policy and social con ‡ict
In recent years the world has seen signi…cant international policy e¤orts at preventing, controlling, and ending armed con ‡ict. The peace-keeping branch of the UN, for example, carries initiatives in a large number of countries. Some of these-notably some countries in Africa-have been involved both in interstate and civil con ‡icts where appropriation is widely known to play an important role. On the other hand, Western democracies and the global community as represented by the UN pursue development e¤orts in the Third World, which include a trade-related dimension. Organizations such as the UN's Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Kingdom's Direction for International Development (DFID) are spearheads to various initiatives that seek to help developing countries increase their exports to richer nations. However, the policies discussed in the context of trade and development strategies are never linked to the initiatives that the same set of actors pursue regarding peace-keeping. Our model suggests that they should be connected, and how.
To see this, suppose we view access to …rst world markets for, say, processed agricultural products, as an improvement in the price for processed agricultural goods produced in a Subsaharan economy. Now note those goods are relatively labor intensive in the latter economies. Then our model predicts that better access to European markets for those goods would cause the labor intensive sector in Subsaharan economies to expand. This would make labor relatively scarcer, raising wages and diminishing con ‡ict in Subsaharan Africa. Unfortunately, less developed countries face signi…cant barriers to the markets in developed countries. Moreover, these barriers (tari¤ barriers especially) are biased against less technology intensive exports (see Meller 2003) .
It follows from our model that when the possibility of lower protection to First World agriculture is discussed within the World Trade Organization, its bene…ts in terms of lower con ‡ict in Africa might have to be taken into account. At the same time, higher European tari¤s, subsidies and sanitary barriers to agricultural products may entail costs in terms of more painstaking peace e¤orts abroad. Our model also warns that export oriented strategies as pursued by UNCTAD and DFID might have to focus on the fact that not every incomeenhancing change may reduce con ‡ict. Fostering the expansion of labor intensive industries could constitute a pacifying force. But the expansion of extractive, more capital intensive activities (that happen to attract signi…cant Western involvement), on the contrary, may fuel con ‡ict instead. See our discussion on "con ‡ict diamonds"in the next section.
First world technological progress and third world con ‡ict
One would think that developing nations will be helped by technology transfers from rich nations: better technologies expand the production possibility frontier and make a country unambiguously richer. However, if developed nations are more capital intensive than developing ones, the innovations the former make available to the latter might be biased thousands of village hunters were being recruited to defend villages "against looting from both the RUF and undisciplined RSLMF elements." (RUF means Revolutionary United Front and RSLMF means Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces.) towards the capital intensive industry. 17 The problem with the adoption of such innovations is that, as shown in Section 4, neutral technical progress in the capital intensive industry will increase con ‡ict. Moreover, the increase in con ‡ict can overcome the direct e¤ect of technical progress on the production possibilities of the economy, resulting in a decrease in total production. As shown in the example below, the decrease in production can be so signi…cant that even capitalists are worse o¤ by the adoption of a technological innovation in the capital intensive sector. Firms in the capital intensive sector have incentives to adopt a better technology and make pro…ts. In equilibrium, all …rms in the sector adopt the improved technology and make zero pro…ts. The impact on factor prices increases con ‡ict, and this increase can be as strong as to leave all owners of labor and capital worse o¤.
Example 2 Technological progress and con ‡ict: Consider an economy with production functions
2 for the labor intensive sector, and the following appropriation technology:
L A . Let us set the total endowments of the two factors of production at levels K = L = 100 and let p 1 = 1. Figure 4 shows the total value of production in the economy for di¤erent levels of technological progress ( ) in the capital intensive sector. While an increase of 5% in the productivity of sector 1 results in an increase of total production, further increases actually have a negative e¤ect on the total production of the economy. by …rms; second, there is an increase in the appropriation losses brought by the increase in con ‡ict. The two forces work in di¤erent directions for capitalists. While technical progress in the capital intensive sector results in an increase in the gross rental price of capital, it also results in an increase in the appropriation they su¤er. Figure 5 shows that the second e¤ect overcomes the …rst one for relatively high rates of technical progress. As a result, both workers and capitalists are made worse o¤ by technical progress.
The example suggests that developing nations with serious con ‡ict issues may not want to adopt every technological improvement that richer countries make available to them, even if these come as a gift. In addition, a con ‡ict-prone society may want to discourage innovation in the capital intensive sector, while encouraging it in the labor intensive sector. This course of action and the trade policies analyzed in the following subsection mirror the interventions proposed by Latin American structuralists (see for instance Prebisch, 1959) and other advocates of state-guided "national development strategies."
Another way to a¤ect the relative productivity of sectors is through education. Basic education increases the productivity of labor and, hence, the productivity of the labor intensive sector relative to the capital intensive one. In this way, basic education increases wages relative to the return to capital and reduces con ‡ict, as long as the impact of basic education on appropriation abilities is relatively weaker than on productive ones.
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6 Con ‡ict and factor speci…city One might think that the predictions of our model are unrealistic in the short run, when some factors of production are …xed. For example, one might expect the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to fail: a positive shock to the price of oil could generate an increase in wages-rather than a decrease-even when oil extraction is a relatively capital intensive sector. But if more valuable natural resources will raise wages, can we still account for the curse of natural resources, whereby the availability of more valuable natural resources increases con ‡ict? If anything, it would seem that such phenomenon must be explained with a model that is compatible with delivering higher con ‡ict and higher wages when, say, the price of a natural resource goes up. In this section we attain precisely this explanation. We study the well known Ricardo-Viner model with industry-speci…c factors and add the appropriation sector. Therefore, the model is as in section 3, with the di¤erence that while labor is still mobile across sectors, capital is not. There are two kinds of capital (K 1 and K 2 ) which are speci…c to each productive industry. The respective endowments of capital are denoted with K 1 and K 2 . The model with industry speci…c factors can be thought to capture short run movements (when capital is …xed), while our basic model in section 3 can be thought to capture long run e¤ects (when all factors are mobile).
We show that natural resource shocks that raise wages are indeed compatible with higher, rather than lower, levels of con ‡ict. The key aspect is that when extractive activities are relatively capital intensive, a shock to the price of natural resources will expand the returns to appropriation even more than it increases its opportunity costs.
Note that when there are industry speci…c factors of production, the de…nition of a sector as "labor intensive" is not too meaningful if one sticks with the de…nition used before, in terms of unit input requirement ratios. In the modi…ed setup, we follow convention by saying an industry is relatively labor intensive when the participation of labor in that industry's income is relatively high. Using standard notation, let i denote the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in sector i (a negative number), and let L i wL i wL i +rK i be the distributive share of labor in the income of sector i. We can now state, Proposition 7 An increase in p 1 results in an increase in con ‡ict dL A dp 1 0 if and only if
. When elasticities of substitution are the same across industries (i.e., when 1 = 2 ), then an increase in p 1 results in an increase in con ‡ict if and only if industry 1 is relatively capital intensive (i.e., when L1 < L2 ).
Proof: See Appendix.
This proposition provides a clear condition under which a change in international prices would result in an increase in con ‡ict. For example, if the elasticities of substitution are the same in both productive sectors, an increase in p 1 results in an increase in con ‡ict if, and only if, sector one is relatively capital intensive. In addition, if the payments to labor are equal in both sectors, an increase in p 1 results in an increase in con ‡ict if, and only if, sector one has, in absolute value, a lower elasticity of substitution than sector 2. The reason is that the lower (in absolute value) the elasticity of substitution of sector 1, the lower the positive impact of the increase of prices on wages.
This result holds regardless of the fact that an increase in p 1 will result in an increase in wages. The increase in p 1 results in an increase in the income of capital (the net e¤ect of an increase in sector 1 and a decrease in sector 2) that is larger than the increase in wages. This causes the potential disputable wealth to rise more than wages, in turn making appropriation activities more attractive to workers. The model with speci…c factors makes clear that the main conclusions of this paper do not depend on the sign of the impact of shocks on wages. Instead, the results depend on the relative impact that shocks have on the retribution to capital and wages, as this governs the relative movements of the bene…ts and costs of con ‡ict.
Is it also the case that an increase in the speci…c endowment of the diamond industry (i.e. rough diamonds) would result in an increase in con ‡ict? While in this model it is di¢ cult to characterize in general the e¤ects of endowment changes on the level of con ‡ict, we provide such results for a Cobb-Douglas economy.
Proposition 8 In a Cobb-Douglas economy, an increase in the endowment of capital of the capital (labor) intensive sector results in an increase (decrease) of con ‡ict.
If we see natural resources such as oil or diamonds as speci…c capital to extractive activities, this section gives an explanation for the curse of natural resources. Increases in the price and availability of diamonds, say, will increase con ‡ict if diamond extraction is relatively capital intensive or displays a low elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Thus, the model can be used to analyze the issue of "con ‡ict diamonds." These are rough diamonds that are seen to fuel con ‡ict because rebel factions have direct access to them and use the revenues to …nance themselves (see Ross 2003) . As a result, governments and parties concerned with the diamond trade have engineered a certi…cation process within an initiative known as the Kimberley process. 19 The aim is to stamp out "con ‡ict diamonds"
and keep them away from the diamond market. The disturbing implication of our model is that every diamond may be a con ‡ict diamond: perfectly legal diamonds that have not been handled by rebels may also increase con ‡ict.
Conclusion
In this paper we re-consider the implications of two canonic general equilibrium models for a small open economy with a realistic distorsion: property rights are not perfectly enforced.
In this way we study how economy-wide forces and policies a¤ect appropriation activities. Our simple theory generates many predictions that are relevant empirically. Our model explains apparently paradoxical stylized facts concerning civil wars: both unfavorable circumstances (such as droughts) and favorable ones (such as higher availability of natural resources) increase the likelihood of civil war. Our theory's predictions are also compatible with the observed positive correlation between crime and inequality. However, it should be noted that our theory also predicts that reducing inequality without a¤ecting the incentives to undertake productive activities may not diminish con ‡ict (as with social programs that provide lump-sum redistributions).
Societies often implement policies that economists consider ine¢ cient. Work on the political economy of endogenous policies (see, inter alia, Stigler 1971 , Peltzman 1976 , Becker 1983 , and Coate and Morris 1995 has shown that such policies may be shaped by political constraints. A similar case can be made when a social constraint is incorporated to economic analysis: policies that make no sense in a socially frictionless world may become attractive to society (and its politicians) in the face of social con ‡ict. Examples are taxing capital to subsidize productive labor, the protection of labor from international trade, and "national development strategies"that distort the pro…le of technical innovations that are adopted by the country's …rms. This helps explain why implementing reforms that appear e¢ cient a priori may be delayed and become unpopular when implemented.
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Our policy results re ‡ect the logic in the theorem of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956 ). Many distortive policies could be rationalized as e¢ cient by positing a (more or less contrived) model featuring some initial distortion. However, we believe our theory deserves attention for two reasons. First, it is based on two canonic models present in every economist's toolkit; those models have shaped the economic intuitions underlying widespread policy advice. Second, the initial distortion we incorporate is a realistic and economically important one. Our theory suggests a novel research and policy agenda surrounding con ‡ict economies, whereby peace-keeping e¤orts and international trade agreements should be integrated. Similarly, it may be useful to reassess development strategies and various economic reforms from the perspective of their impact on social con ‡ict.
For future work, we believe it is possible to expand our analysis to dynamic settings where agents can accumulate capital. We expect that the e¤ects we have identi…ed will still be present, such as that of taxes to capital and subsidies to productive labor: if, as we have shown, this policy can reduce con ‡ict so much as to reduce the overall burden on capitalists, it will increase, rather than decrease, capital accumulation. Future work could also re-examine state intervention across countries. 21 This presence varies widely both in terms of the regulation of business and in terms of welfare institutions (Shleifer, 2004) . This variety may embody di¤erent approaches to purchasing social peace.
Appendix
Extensions
In this appendix we study several extensions to the basic model of section 2 and …nd that the results are robust: …rst, we study the case in which the appropriation sector employs both capital and labor; second, we study appropriation with imperfect competition; and …nally we study appropriation with endogenous enforcement.
The case when appropriation employs labor and capital We now show that the results of the paper also hold when both capital and labor are used in the appropriation sector under the condition that this sector is labor intensive relative to the whole economy. Consider the economy from section 2 with the only di¤erence that now the amount of appropriation is A (L A ; K A ) [p 1 q 1 + q 2 ]. We assume that the appropriation sector combines labor and capital in amounts that minimize the cost of a given amount of appropriation and that, as before, A (L A ; K A ) presents decreasing returns to scale. In equilibrium, the returns from appropriation must equal the total value of the factors used in the sector:
We study next how changes in prices a¤ect the level of activity of the appropriation sector.
Proposition 9 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase in the level of activity of the appropriation sector dA dp 1 > 0 if and only if the appropriation sector is labor intensive relative to the economy
Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A = and the equilibrium condition we get:
. The denominator is negative given that, because of A(:) having decreasing returns to scale, the average cost is lower than the marginal cost. The numerator is negative if and only if
and the result follows.
As in Section 4, changes in technology can be studied in a way analogous to the one just used to study price changes and the extension of the results in section 5 follows.
Imperfect competition in the appropriation sector We assume now that, instead of a perfect competitive appropriation sector, there is a given number of appropriation groups. Each appropriation group hires labor and must pay a wage equivalent to the (net of appropriation) wage workers can earn in the productive industries. We assume that a group's share of the total amount of appropriated resources equals its share of labor in the sector. In this way, the revenues for group i are
, where L Ai and L A i represent the demand of labor of group i and the rest of the con ‡ict sector, respectively.
The group will choose L Ai to maximize pro…ts. In equilibrium and appealing to symmetry the …rst order condition yields an analog to equation (5) in section 3:
where L A = P N i L Ai . Note that when N ! 1 the last equation reduces to equation (5). This more general model yields analogous comparative statics results to those we show for the perfectly competitive case.
Proposition 10 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase in con ‡ict dL A dp 1 0 .
Proof. Di¤erentiating equation (9) with respect to r w we obtain:
The denominator is negative from the concavity of A (L A ) and, hence, As in Section 4, changes in technology can be studied in a way analogous to the one just used to study price changes and the extension of the results in section 5 follows.
Appropriation and the enforcement of the law Until now we have implicitly assumed that the amount of resources allocated to enforce property rights is given and does not react to economic shocks. We now study the possibility that the government may choose the amount of resources devoted to enforcing property rights, with the goal of minimizing the overall mass of resources that are driven away from production.
Assume that the fraction of production appropriated depends on both the amounts of labor devoted to the appropriation sector (L A ) and to an enforcement sector (L E ). The technology of appropriation is summarized by the function A(L A ; L E ), which is increasing and concave in L A and decreasing in L E . The overall burden of con ‡ict is then given by the addition of criminals and enforcers, as they are all detracted from the labor force. Here we show that our previous results capture the behavior of the overall burden of con ‡ict.
We assume that agents decide whether to join a productive industry or the appropriation sector given the level of enforcement the government has chosen. This means the government chooses the socially optimal level of enforcement given the parameters of the model, knowing that the amount of labor in the appropriation sector will depend on the level of enforcement. In other words, the government chooses L E to minimize the total amount of labor allocated to non-productive activities (L A + L E ) where L A depends on L E . After this, workers make career decisions and production takes place. We assume that the government obtains the enforcement labor by either a draft, or by equally taxing capital and labor and devoting the revenues to pay public wages that enforcement agents will …nd attractive. Either assumption implies that equations (1) to (3) remain unaltered. The right hand side of equation (4) now reads L L A L E , and equation (5) becomes
Whenever an interior solution for the government problem exists (conditions which we can characterize), the following holds:
Proposition 11 An increase in the price of the capital intensive output results in an increase in the burden of con ‡ict.
Proof. The equilibrium condition for the appropriation sector can be written as A(L A ; L E ) = As in Section 4, changes in technology can be studied in a way analogous to the one just used to study price changes and the extension of the results in section 5 follows.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let q 1 = K 1 L 1 1 and q 2 = K 2 L 1 2 be the production functions in the productive sectors. Then the equilibrium conditions in (10) and (11) become:
(1 )
